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 The September 11, 2001, attacks raised emergency response to the level of 
national consciousness in the United States.  The George W. Bush Administration 
(Bush II hereafter) quickly took center stage in this respect, but with the help of 
Congress went beyond responding to an emergency to embrace aspects of police 
statism and global expansionism.  Some call this mission creep; others, imperial 
overstretch.1  Foreign affairs connoisseurs agree that it involves a quest for empire and 
dispute only whether this is good for the world.2   If good, however, why has Bush II 
cloaked its global agenda in the rhetorical mantle of fighting ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’?  
Perhaps because it includes objectives which are too controversial to express in plain 
English?  In-depth policy analysis is certainly in order.3  Here, though, I focus on just 
one question: To what extent is the Administration’s post-9/11 rhetoric compatible with 
the identifiable traits of emergency thinking and emergency planning?4 
 Emergency thinking and emergency planning are, I suggest, two quite different 
kinds of response to a perceived state of emergency.  One is an immediate, the other, a 
long-term response.  Emergency thinking, first, is a mental process of responding to a 
life-threatening situation in a short and unextendable period of time on the basis of 
incurably inadequate information. A person so situated can’t wait to be fully informed 
before acting, but on the basis of limited information must quickly decide what to do. 
Such a course of action can barely satisfy philosophers’ criteria for reasonableness and 
responsibility, never mind rationality.5  But these criteria are ordinarily inapplicable to, 
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even counterproductive in, such an emergency situation.  So whatever the outcome, 
such action should ordinarily be judged leniently.6  Then, when the immediate 
emergency and its judgment-impairing circumstances have passed, planning how to 
handle future emergencies should begin. 
 Emergency planning goes beyond a particular emergency to reflect on 
emergencies both retrospectively and proactively. The outcome of emergency thinking 
depends, accordingly, on preparatory as well as situational deliberation.  Time, though, 
is not always a friend in this regard.  Some people live in constant peril of one 
emergency after another, for example, in a war zone.  Others live more tranquil lives 
and have time to plan for future contingencies.  This is especially the case for political 
leaders who are duly apprized of, so can usually protect themselves from, surrounding 
dangers.  It is curious, then, that America’s political leaders characterized the 9/11 
emergency as having no end in sight and as being of such a nature that their response 
had to involve military action. 
 This issue obviously involves political questions; but it also raises ethical and 
legal as well as epistemological questions.  Here I wish to address the latter – within the 
context of the former.  I begin by examining political and journalistic discourse about 
terrorism both before and since 9/11/2001.  Then I consider various approaches to 
emergency response in our social world -- in emergency-oriented organizations and in 
varying responses to repetitive crises, including air raid defenses and a ‘911' system.  
After some brief remarks about philosophers’ minimal interest in such matters, I draw 
some quasi-philosophical conclusions about the US government’s antiterrorism rhetoric. 
US government emergency responses before and after 9/11 
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 To what extent can Bush II’s post-9/11 “antiterrorism” actions be understood as 
appropriate second-level responses to the 9/11 attacks and what they revealed as to 
dangers that lay ahead?  US spokespersons have predicted multiple, inevitable crises, 
but warnings have never identified a definite time and place.  There have indeed been a 
number of anti-Western bombing incidents overseas, especially after the US takeover of 
Iraq.  But the major courses of action have all been US-initiated: attacking Afghanistan, 
attacking Iraq, and warning the world it will do more of the same whenever necessary 
for “national defense.”  Is any of this identifiable as emergency response? 
 Process in a political context is, of course, complex; and the post-9/11 process is 
no exception, involving, for example, selective attention to and funding of response 
arrangements both domestically and abroad.  At the risk of over-simplifying, however, I 
suggest that there are two extremes of relevant response: one, based on direct 
attention to vulnerable people’s well-being; the other, based on the belief that people’s 
well-being requires a global if not imperialist agenda only incidentally tied to domestic 
security.  The former is instantiated by practical proposals (e.g., the federalization of 
airport security) the implementation of which should improve Americans’ ability to ward 
off terrorist acts.  The latter takes shape only if one recognizes that US military 
initiatives after 9/11 are consistent with a strategy already in place and only rhetorically 
tied to the tragic attacks on that day.  If tied in with this global strategy, President Bush’s 
reference to three nation-states allegedly developing nuclear weapons (Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea) as an “axis of evil” is emergency-related.  But it is also a rhetorical 
umbrella, because it disregards the fact that (1) a half-dozen other nation-states have 
incomparably more nuclear weapons (Pakistan and India, Russia and Israel, the UK 
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and the US); that (2) “a decade after the end of the Cold War, hundreds of thousands of 
American troops, supplied with the world’s most advanced weaponry, sometimes 
including nuclear arms, are stationed on over sixty-one base complexes in nineteen 
countries worldwide, using the  Department of Defense’s narrowest definition of a ‘major 
installation’”7 (e.g., Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey); and that (3) the US government is 
now establishing additional bases (e.g., in Uzbekistan, Qatar, and most recently four in 
Iraq). 
 These expansionary military arrangements do not easily qualify as emergency 
responses unless, say, the Soviet Union will soon be reassembled or the People’s 
Republic of China will soon emerge as a competitive superpower, or a country such as 
Iraq will strike out against American interests.  With the possible exception of pre-war 
portrayals of Iraq, none of these scenarios has instant credibility to ordinary people, so 
an open-ended war on terrorism is a convenient substitute.  In other words, the Al 
Qaeda-centered rhetoric is diversionary if not deceptive.  For, it is being used to 
legitimate not homeland defense so much as the aforementioned global outreach most 
of which is only remotely related to Americans’ reasonable fears.8 
 Within policy-making circles, on the other hand, the particularities of this global 
outreach were already being identified by a group of self-styled conservative 
internationalists (among them Elliott Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle) a 
decade ago.9  In the year 2000 their views came together with those of other neo-
conservatives in a book entitled Present Dangers.  In the book’s preface co-editors 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol described their and their contributors’ worries as 
follows: 
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Events of recent years have given us no reason to change our 
fundamental view either of the emerging dangers or of the prescriptions 
for meeting these dangers. . . . The emergence of China as a strong, 
determined, and potentially hostile power; the troubling direction of 
political developments in Russia; the continuing threat posed by 
aggressive dictatorships in Iraq, Serbia, and North Korea; the increasingly 
alarming decline in American military capabilities – all these and more 
suggest that the coming years may be critical in determining the fate of 
international peace and of the American hegemony on which that peace 
depends.  The aim of this collection of essays is  . . . to offer 
recommendations to American policy-makers on how to meet and 
overcome the challenges we face in the world.10 
 
 Granting, then, that post-9/11 discourse in the US has focused on finding ways to 
heighten people’s security in the future, this discourse has split into a domestic and a 
foreign agenda.  On the domestic side, Americans have been discussing better ways to 
protect their infrastructure in all its complexity against potential agents of destruction.  
The foreign side, by contrast, has focused on identifying targets for US warriors, 
devising strategies for striking these targets, and obtaining sufficient funds to do so.  
Only token attention is paid to causal analysis, alternative approaches such as policy 
review and diplomacy, the morality of killing civilians (referred to simply as “collateral 
damage”) or incarcerating unnamed suspects without filing any charges against them.11 
 Almost all post-9/11 rhetoric has been associated with the emergency situation of 
that day and framed in terms of terrorists and terrorism.  But the foreign agenda has had 
both a narrow focus on Afghanistan and a broad focus on other nations.  Responses 
based on this agenda have been called at times a campaign but more often a war, 
embellished as “a war on terrorism” support for which distinguishes good nations from 
bad.  In time this focus on terrorists gave way to a different focus on “rogue” states that 
allegedly support terrorists.  Either focus, though, helps resurrect a Manichean dualism 
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that had been downplayed in public statements since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
even vis-á-vis mainland China.12  So these rhetorical tropes and the menacing 
metaphors they invoke warrant careful examination.  I will do so first with regard to pre-
9/11 US government foreign affairs, then in the post-9/11 context. 
 Long before those hijacked planes struck centers of finance and war-planning in 
the United States, the US government had shown itself to be the biggest bully on this 
planet.  In particular, its singular manner of dealing with “uncooperative” entities around 
the world could arguably earn it the title of world’s most active terrorist or, at least, 
supporter of terrorists.  It has not been so designated domestically, of course, largely 
because of its ability to sanitize its own statements and discourage other renditions in 
those of the media.  First, some facts in this regard; then some examples of their 
rhetorical cover. 
 The nineteenth century history of the US government’s policy of virtual genocide 
against Native Americans is well known; that of its use of military force to bring Cuba, 
Hawaii, and The Philippines under its self-righteously protective wings, less so.  Not 
even its twentieth-century actions to prevent Central American, South American, and 
Southeast Asian countries from deviating from its “sphere of influence” are mentioned 
any more.  Nonetheless, the CIA did train and arm state agents to “pacify” 
uncooperative people in South Vietnam (the Phoenix program), Indonesia, and 
elsewhere even to this day.  If all instances of US support of violent repression to keep 
the world open to corporate “values” were gathered into one detailed account, a 
resourceful editor might use the word ‘terrorism’ to systematize this imperialist history.   
But in the United States as elsewhere official defenders of controversial policies 
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routinely deny or try to put a positive “spin” on such facts.  Many scholars who ought to 
know better simply take it for granted that truth-telling is not to be expected of political 
spokespersons.13  A better approach, I believe, is that of Noam Chomsky, who prefers 
to learn “the true meaning of principles that are proclaimed” and to this end invites us to 
“go beyond rhetorical flourishes and public pronouncements, and . . . investigate actual 
practice.”14  Note, then, how slippery US spokespersons had been for decades prior to 
9/11 in their talk about terrorism. 
 A convenient place to begin this review is with the US government’s repeated 
rejection of UN declarations and World Court rulings that impugn its direct or indirect 
armed interference in countries where potentially uncooperative insurgents are active, 
e.g., regarding Nicaragua (1986) and Panama (1987).  No less telling is the US’s 
position on a December 7, 1987,  resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning 
“Terrorism Whenever and by Whomever Committed.”  This resolution was passed by a 
vote of 153 to 2, with only the United States and Israel opposed. Six years later, in 
1993, the US representatives at a World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
proudly proclaimed their country’s commitment to universal human rights.  With 
comparable dexterity in 2002, the US agreed to an Anti-Terror Pact with Southeast Asia 
countries only after wording was changed to say that it “recognizes” rather than 
promises to act in accordance with “the principles of sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and . . . nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states.” 
 The rhetorical rules that guide these manifestly inconsistent stances can be 
gleaned from a US State Department press conference in April 2000 at which 
Counterterrorism Coordinator Michael Sheehan demonstrated how the government he 
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served assigns the terrorist label.  The report he was presenting to reporters praised 
Turkey’s efforts to suppress terrorists and in answer to questions he promptly identified 
Cuba as a state that sponsors terrorism.  When asked why Colombian paramilitaries 
were not so identified in spite of their known commitment of atrocities against civilians, 
he declared that such designations involve a very meticulous legal process, their 
activities were under review, and “if we come up with a case from our legal definition, 
they’ll be designated” as terrorists.15  The review in question is apparently still pending; 
meanwhile the US is supporting a new hard-line president in Colombia whose policy 
towards guerillas favors extermination over negotiation. 
 During the months immediately before 9/11, talk of terrorists and terrorism was 
not a centerpiece of rhetoric for public consumption.  There were laws in effect that 
used this terminology, including one passed in the United States in1996.  Moreover, the 
previous administration is said to have provided the new incumbents with a detailed 
plan to deal with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  This plan was buried in bureaucratic re-
examination, though, until endorsed just days before the attacks.  At the top of Bush II’s 
global agenda were mounting a missile defense system and rejecting international 
agreements.  After reviewing US military strategy for the future, the US Secretary of 
Defense announced mid-2001 that the country should no longer plan for two foreign 
wars but for one foreign and one domestic war.  Tax relief and “family values” still 
dominated the administration’s domestic rhetoric.16 
 In the wake of 9/11, all this changed dramatically, but neither government nor 
media called attention to the change.  At first each cited inadequate knowledge to 
account for the US government’s failure to have prevented the attacks.  Yet in a matter 
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of days the government claimed it had more than enough detailed information to justify 
military responses, focused initially on Al Qaeda and the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan, but soon expanded to include other nation-states as potential targets.  
Rather than proving the linkages asserted, both government and media have relied on 
the terms ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’ to refer directly to non-governmental agents and 
indirectly to nation-states which, they allege, sponsor terrorists.   
 This terminology is used only selectively.  It disregards armed conflicts that seem 
not to endanger perceived US interests.  As for those that do, the US identifies a 
preferred winner and brands the disfavored cause terrorist in inspiration and 
motivation.17  So doing, it mimics Israel’s longstanding practice of branding as terrorist 
any Palestinian violence in protest against their occupation and oppression.18  As 
applied around the globe it lends itself to an imperialistic doctrine that only authorized 
agents of US-approved nation-states have any right to bear arms against their 
oppressors.19  And the US backs up its Manichean foreign policy with money, materiel, 
and sometimes personnel -- secretly if possible, otherwise openly.  Recent problematic 
beneficiaries of this strategy include Colombia, The Phillippines, and Indonesia.20 
  As noted, US spokespersons do identify some nation-states as targets of their 
“war on terrorism”; but, perhaps to avoid discussions about where and to whom the US 
distributes weapons, they tend to apply the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ only to 
groups and not to nation-states.21  In so doing, they narrow the scope of these terms far 
more than do dictionaries or, for that matter, scholars as renowned as Hannah Arendt.22  
Indirectly, however, their war on terrorism covers each of the principal dictionary 
meanings.  For this so-called war is directed against the use of violence (1) by a state to 
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control its people (state terrorism), (2) by agents of a state to challenge others within or 
beyond its borders (state-sponsored terrorism), and (3) by non-aligned groups against 
civilians and/or against one or more nation-states.  But they do not do this consistently, 
as might a social scientist.  They loudly associated Iraq under Saddam Hussein with the 
first usage, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea with the second; and sotto voce suggested that 
Arab nations’ support of Palestinians also fits the second usage.  They’ve applied the 
third with intensity to the Al Qaeda movement.  Each type of targeting an entity for their 
antiterrorism campaign has generated controversy.  Europeans and Russians have 
disputed identifying Iran or even Iraq with the second usage, and Arab leaders face 
dissent at home if they do not support Palestinians.  (Inversely, the current leader of 
Pakistan faces dissent for supporting the US agenda.)  The third usage, though, has 
created the most complex diplomatic problems.  Take just three examples: nations 
using ‘terrorist’ rhetoric to demean their own internal opposition; freezing of bank 
accounts; and holding prisoners at Guantánamo. 
 First, the concept of a war on terrorism has proven a godsend to troubled 
governments everywhere.  They apply the third usage with alacrity to movements they 
want to suppress: Russia to Chechens, Israel (now more than ever) to Palestinians, 
Spain to militant Basques, China to the Falun Gong, Indonesia to the Gam in Aceh, and 
Colombia, The Philippines, Pakistan, and India to other dissident groups.23    
 Second, the process of freezing accounts has had limited success, largely 
because the usual suspects transfer funds by means of e-mails and faxes that update 
the age-old system of hawala, which involves authorizing exchanges by means of 
strategically dispersed letters of credit.  Nor are Western-style transfers easily 
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monitored, as witness what happened to three Somali-born, well respected citizens of 
Sweden. Their names were included on a list of 170 groups and individuals that the US 
Treasury Department cited for funding Al Qaeda.  The Swedish government promptly 
froze their accounts, and negative reactions in Sweden reverberated in the UN Security 
Council.  When France appealed for specific criteria, such as a direct link to the Taliban 
or Al Qaeda, before freezing an account, the chairman of the UN sanctions committee 
justified the freezes with circular reasoning.  Said he: “We are dealing with terrorism.  It 
may be controversial, but all who have suggested alternatives are aware that we must 
not waste time on definitions, because the terrorists are acting.”  Months later, the 
names of two of the Swedes were removed from the list.24 
 Third, the US government’s antiterrorist justification for bypassing the legal rights 
of people arrested and held without charges, especially those caught up in some 
violation of their immigrant status, has generated considerable controversy.  Even 
countries otherwise supportive of Bush II’s  “war on terrorism” disapprove of its refusal 
to identify the “detainees” being held on Cuba as prisoners of war.  U.S. Secretary of 
State Colin Powell shares their concern because he does not want captured American 
military personnel to be treated as other than prisoners of war.  Oblivious to this and 
other negative consequences beyond its borders, the Administration at first espoused 
the noncommittal definition for pragmatic reasons.  Those being held, they explained, 
are there to be interrogated, but Article III of the Geneva Conventions prohibits 
interrogating prisoners of war beyond such basics as name, rank, and serial number. 
So, the administration rejoined, this war is not really a war, because the enemy is not a 
nation-state, so those being held are merely “unlawful combatants.”  Put simply, these 
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people have information we want, so they can’t be prisoners of war, which they’re not 
because they are terrorists.25 
 Opposition to this casuistry was immediate and intense.  One columnist argued 
that “(t)he Geneva Conventions of 1949 say they must be considered prisoners of war 
unless a competent tribunal finds otherwise”26 and many influential leaders around the 
world agreed.  So Bush II eventually conceded that captured Taliban (but not Al Qaeda) 
fighters had been military agents of a nation-state, hence are prisoners of war.  
Afghanistan, though, is not a “High Contracting Party” of the Geneva Conventions, the 
international community never recognized its government under the Taliban as a state, 
and, inversely, it is moot whether any detainee is a terrorist under any existing law.27  
But even if the individuals being held at Guantànamo are not clearly covered under 
international law, they are arguably entitled to fundamental human rights.28 
 Not everyone is prepared to extend human rights to combatants, of course, 
especially if their status is not readily identified with the way wars are supposed to be 
fought, namely, between recognized nation-states.  It so happens, though, that most 
wars are not of this type. Nation-states are often involved, though, at least indirectly.  
This all too common practice, notes Joseph Nye, is consistent with the recent trend 
towards putting public functions in private hands: “Privatisation,” he says, “has been 
increasing, and terrorism is the privatisation of war.”29  One need only add that US 
citizens have often undertaken military activities outside of the nation-state standard -- 
from the Minute Men in the colonial era down through CIA operatives and military 
“advisors” in numerous countries including pre-Taliban Afghanistan.  Each such 
nontraditional activity and/or counter-activity generates pros and cons. 
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 In response to widespread defense of the Guantànamo captives’ rights, Bush II 
announced some due process rules for trials, including a right of appeal to a three-
member military panel.30  The President can appoint a civilian to this panel as a 
temporary military officer.  By law such an appointment is authorized only in a national 
emergency; but this, says the Administration, is the case here.  And, they add, since the 
war on terrorism is open-ended, these tribunals have no “sunset provision”; and, they 
insist, a detainee need not be released even if acquitted.  Not even a US citizen can 
appeal to a federal court if being held as an enemy combatant in the war on terrorism.31 
 Some commentators agree with this open-ended detention because, they say, 
combatants are not released till hostilities cease, as was the case in World War II.  This 
is a false analogy, however, because in the current situation the very concept of 
cessation is vacuous.  Indeed, Bush II contends that we face a national emergency 
which is ongoing and without discernible end.32  Even if true, it is nonetheless disturbing 
that new funding for this emergency is aimed almost exclusively at military and post-
military projects, notably in Iraq, even as funds heretofore directed to social needs are 
being cut if not eliminated.33  What matters in the context of this paper, however, is that 
those engaged in this ongoing discourse regarding terrorism must eventually recognize 
that the initial emergency has passed. 
 If this be granted, then the task before us is to reassess the gravity of dangers 
we face and how well we are prepared to defend ourselves against them.  If this 
reassessment is to be effective, it must be based on adequate information shared 
among all who need to know.  If we let naked appeals to national security justify 
excessive secrecy, we facilitate transforming a finite emergency into a generalized state 
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of emergency without supporting evidence.  To the contrary, as some permanent 
members of the UN Security Council argued in the debate regarding action against Iraq, 
Bush II should be held to convincing evidentiary standards if it expects support for 
bellicosity under the guise of fighting terrorism.  Unfortunately, its modus operandi has 
shown no interest in such epistemological constraints.  Its rhetoric is directed rather to 
persuading people that they are and will remain in an emergency situation.  Indeed, 
according to President Bush and his entourage, the 9/11 emergency is not only ongoing 
and without discernible end but is becoming ever more dangerous.34   If this is the case, 
as claimed, then reliance on flexibility (one of their favorite ideas) as the heart of 
emergency response will increasingly trump the more reasonable approach of 
emergency planning.35  Reasonable emergency planning is, however, an antidote to 
excessive flexibility.  It is appropriate, then, to include here a brief account of emergency 
planning especially as it relates to counterterrorism. 
 
Organized responses to emergencies 
 Emergency responses range from the proverbial band-aid to total war.  The more 
complex the envisioned danger, the more complex advanced planning may need to be.  
But as the futility of the Maginot Line showed in 1939, organized complexity is no 
assurance of security in the absence of accurate analysis of dangers likely to be faced. 
 Organized responses to emergencies presuppose a recognition that 
emergencies are multi-faceted and as such call for complex structures that can be 
appropriately activated as needed.  The appropriate degree of complexity at any given 
time is inevitably a compromise between breadth and versatility, as US lawmakers have 
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learned while trying to upgrade and interconnect the vastly different agencies whose 
missions in any way involve neutralizing trans-border threats.36  This, though, is only 
one segment of the emergency response complex, each component of which focuses 
on some type of danger that needs to be minimized.  In a democracy, moreover, 
authorizing legislation typically specifies the nature, scope, and orientation of each 
organized response to emergencies.  Not surprisingly, then, both statutory and case law 
have engendered a network of policies that apply to emergency responses.  Extra-legal 
considerations often transform intended specificity, however. 
 In the United States, for example, the over-all purpose of the military-industrial 
complex is purportedly for “national defense,” not for aggressive intervention beyond its 
borders.  When asked to assess a seemingly repressive policy, ordinarily during 
wartime, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently decided that the emergency facing 
the nation justifies the action taken, for example, confining Japanese-American citizens 
during World War II.  Throughout the twentieth century, whether during wartime or not, 
the Court struggled to salvage the First Amendment even as it supported most 
government actions aimed at keeping Communists at bay.  Famous for this purpose 
was the “clear and present danger test,” which as interpreted over the years protected 
non-activist public speech however critical of the government.  So too was the Court’s 
denial of a right to falsely shout “fire” in a crowded theater. These cases created a First 
Amendment doctrine that speech is protected except when it goes beyond expressing 
ideas to inciting others to violence.  But they did not directly address covert speech, i.e., 
secret discussions, in which subversive plans are laid and thereafter concealed until 
they emerge as actions.  These too must be monitored, some say, if law enforcement 
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personnel are to prevent terrorist activities.  So new laws that address these needs 
have been adopted that put at risk the very values they are meant to protect.37    
 The counter-intelligence community, we are told, now considers religious 
(meaning primarily Islamist) fundamentalism a more dangerous mind set than “atheistic 
communism”.38  Laws passed in recent decades to counteract terrorism apply, however, 
to terrorists of whatever stripe.  In Europe acts against airplanes and airports are 
criminalized by the Hague Convention, 1970; the Bonn Summit, 1978; the EEC 
Terrorism, Radicalism, Violence International Agreement; and the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1977.  In 1973-1974, the UK passed 
temporary and emergency laws to deal with mostly land-based acts of terrorism in 
Northern Ireland39; and a quarter-century later it passed The Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (effective July 2000) and made permanent and generalized its Northern 
Ireland provisions as The Terrorism Act (effective 2001).  The latter broadens the 
definition of domestic and transnational terrorism throughout the UK to cover violent 
acts and threats against individuals and property – including electronic systems – 
intended to influence the government or promote political, religious, or ideological 
causes.  It authorizes the government to ban groups involved in domestic or 
transnational terrorism and to use special arrest powers to prosecute their members or 
supporters.40 
 Such laws are passed in response to a profound sense of danger -– not 
necessarily to the people but at times only to the government, as recently illustrated in 
Zimbabwe.  Already in 1798, however, the US Congress passed the Alien and Sedition 
Acts to criminalize anti-government activities of all kinds, whether by immigrants whom 
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the Federalists feared would vote Republican or by “domestic traitors” who uttered anti-
government words.  These laws expired when Jefferson became president in 1800,41 
and nothing comparable emerged until the hot and cold wars of the twentieth century.  
More recent additions include: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 
which created secret federal courts that are essentially not subject to constitutional 
limits on searches and seizures and on trial proceedings; the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which bolstered criminal penalties in the wake of 
anti-government bombings; and the USA PATRIOT Act, passed and signed in late 
October, 2001.  The 1996 Act authorizes (a) appropriate U.S. government agencies to 
identify individuals, groups, and nation-states that sponsor terrorism, restrain them by 
legal and extra-legal means, and (b)  the President to take military action against 
them.42  The 2001 Act greatly expands the government’s investigatory prerogatives as 
authorized under the earlier laws.43 
 Other countries have acted both legally and otherwise to suppress threatening 
organizations in their midst.44  And a number of UN conventions seek to control terrorist 
acts: by protecting diplomats and other internationalists (New York,1973), prohibiting 
hostage taking (New York, 1979), terrorist bombings (New York,1997), financing 
terrorism (New York, 1999), committing an endangering act on an airplane (Tokyo, 
1963), seizing a plane (The Hague, 1970), endangering international civil aviation 
(Montreal, 1971 and 1988) or maritime navigation (Rome, 1988); protecting nuclear 
material (Vienna,1980), and requiring that plastic explosives be clearly marked for 
shipping (Montreal, 1991).  The efficacy of these multilateral treaties on terrorism 
depends, of course, on how well they are incorporated into member-states’ laws and 
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enforced. 
 Enforcement is a challenging exercise in organizational ingenuity.  For, statutory 
authorizations do not automatically yield coordinated responses but may instead lead to 
balkanization and jurisdictional turf-protection.  In the United States in particular, 
numerous emergency-oriented entities are in place on both the federal and state levels 
and in civil society.  Most of these deal with a specific kind of emergency, e.g., those 
involving natural disasters (the Federal Emergency Management Agency), plane 
crashes (the Federal Aviation Agency), nuclear power plants (the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission), and the nation’s electric grid (monitored by the little-known National 
Infrastructure Protection Center, located at FBI headquarters since 1998).  Individual 
states and cities also have agencies that deal with disasters, including those caused by 
terrorists.  Most have around-the-clock emergency operations centers, usually 
supported by such on-call emergency communications systems as 911.  Various 
professional organizations, e.g., of emergency health care providers and managers of 
emergency response networks, routinely look for ways to improve response procedures 
and practices, as do such transnational non-governmental organizations as Oxfam, 
Doctors Without Borders, and the American Friends Service Committee. 
 Post-9/11, improvement of emergency response organizations has become at 
least a political priority.  New task forces, commissions, and advisory panels have been 
created to devise better ways to protect such vulnerable public goods as bridges, 
seaports, and water supplies.  The US executive branch took the lead in this endeavor 
by establishing an advisory office of “homeland security.”  Soon seen to be little more 
than a public relations ploy, it remained just that until revelations of pre-9/11 failure to 
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coordinate intelligence information began to threaten the President’s approval rating.  
So in response to the Congress’s improvement rhetoric, the administration proposed 
and Congress eventually passed the Homeland Security Act, which elevates the so-
named office into a cabinet-level intelligence-screening agency to which a number of 
other agencies not directly involved in intelligence are to report.45  In actual practice, 
however, state and local governments still bear principal responsibility for people’s 
security.46  They have accordingly been reassessing their response capabilities, e.g., to 
protect nuclear power plants against aerial attacks and if required to evacuate people 
from an area where an attack has occurred.47  The private sector protection industry, 
long a provider of guards, property security experts, metal detectors, and surveillance 
cameras, is now offering to sell bomb-sniffing dogs, neutron scanners of freight 
containers, facial recognition devices, identity cards, and specialized schools  for “first 
responders”.48  
 Apart from such state-of-the-art approaches to safety and security, our lived 
world is built up out of thousands of practices and products each of which has been 
introduced over time to minimize some perceived danger.  In lieu of a complete 
phenomenology of these artifacts, here’s a sample list: curbs on sidewalks, railings 
along stairways and elevated walkways; train whistles and automatic gates where 
vehicles cross the tracks; traffic signals, flashing lights, and posted speed limits on 
streets and roadways; hinge-mounted stop signs on school buses; gutters and down-
spouts on houses; the horn on an equestrian saddle; the countless pharmaceuticals for 
every unwanted condition from asthma to zoster; the airplane seat usable as a flotation 
device; ice-melting pellets and sun-shielding creams; gas masks and bullet-proof vests.  
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Add to these such obsolete safety devices as parapets and moats, city walls and gates. 
Protective helmets are on view in museums, but also on American-style football fields 
and at auto racing events. 
 In short, protective measures have been a part of human existence from time 
immemorial; but the dangers that need to be addressed change over time.  Some 
devices or strategies become obsolete; others that can be modified and improved to 
meet new threats endure; still others are introduced anew to respond to unprecedented 
challenges.  Out of this ongoing quest for security come danger-specific organized 
responses which by their nature remain open to improvement in light of past 
experience. 
 As the desire for a black belt in karate illustrates, this improvement process 
applies to individuals as well as to organizations.  But the average individual’s need to 
respond to an emergency might well be a once-in-a-lifetime experience.  For many 
persons in positions of public responsibility, emergencies are recurrent and as such 
necessitate planning to prevent or at least limit damages associated with their 
occurrence.  Military personnel, for example, train for life-threatening situations on an 
ongoing basis.  Other people, without being in such an inherently hazardous situation, 
face emergencies repeatedly.  These emergencies are of two types, those that regularly 
involve a high degree of personal endangerment and those that usually do not.  An 
example of the former is the air raid; of the latter, a 911 call.49 
 Except in the case of a surprise attack such as that on Pearl Harbor in 1941, an 
air raid occurring as it does under wartime conditions is perceived to be both currently 
endangering and repeatable.  On the basis of knowledge available about the kinds of 
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planes being used to deliver bombs, civil defense authorities will have identified places 
usable as air raid shelters, stocked them appropriately, and set up a warning system 
such as a siren to inform people of an imminent attack.  Anyone who survives a 
particular air raid is, of course, relieved; but this relief is dampened both by seeing the 
new damage above ground and by realizing that there is likely to be another air raid, 
perhaps the following night (as in London during the WW II blitz).  Living under these 
conditions of recurring assault is traumatizing, but one can cling to the hope that some 
raid will be the last and, if one survives that, then the bliss of pre-war peace and quiet 
will return.50  Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki such consolations are of limited value, 
especially now that “first strike” capability is being elevated to the level of policy.  But 
there was a time, early in the cold war era, when people were led to believe that civil 
defense drills and air raid shelters could somehow limit the carnage that a nuclear 
explosion would unleash. 
 A 911 system also involves people using devices to help save lives.  A 911 call, if 
authentic, signals an emergency; and, as in the case of an air raid, those who respond 
assume there will be other emergencies to which they must also respond.  Some first 
responders, notably police and firefighters, know they may be putting themselves in 
harm’s way; others, notably emergency medical technicians, ordinarily do not.  All are 
however part of an organized system that has grown out of reflections on past 
emergencies and proposals about how better to address those to come in the future.  
Their efficacy, like that of air traffic controllers, depends to a great extent on the caliber 
of their equipment.  In the first place, a 911 dispatcher seldom gets all information 
needed to assess the nature and severity of an emergency and arrange for the most 
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appropriate response.51  So call centers rely on Automatic Number Identification and 
Automatic Location Identification (ANI/ALI) to learn the caller’s address and phone 
number as well as any other pre-provided information.  Other equipment indicates the 
type of phone being used.  And many 911 centers now use Computer Aided Dispatch 
(CAD) and satellite-based Global Positioning to pinpoint a caller’s location.  All this 
equipment facilitates sending appropriate responders to a specific site to address the 
crisis situation and minimize its consequences insofar as possible.52 
 In short, both a 911 call and an air raid involve an emergency.  At some point in 
time, it  will be over; and the person or persons in danger will either have survived 
intact, been hospitalized, or been listed as a fatality.  That is to say, each particular 
emergency does end.  But neither those who respond to emergencies nor their 
hierarchy of supervisors can just forget about past incidents without learning anything 
from them.  They must instead do emergency planning, which involves consulting and 
building on available data in order to prevent or at least reduce the harm that results 
from future emergencies.  This understood, it is no less obvious that the 9/11 attacks 
created an emergency and called for no less complex responses.  What by now should 
be clear, though, is that not all those responses, especially those by the US 
government, have in fact been focused on that emergency or on any reasonably 
foreseeable emergency.  Instead, political rhetoric has practically abandoned concrete 
reality.  Often accused of having done likewise, then, philosophers do not immediately 
come to mind as professionals able to remedy this situation.  Yet they do have a few 
well-pointed arrows in their quiver. 
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Emergency response in philosophy 
 Philosophers have not dealt with emergency thinking or planning as such, for 
reasons suggested below. But they haven’t ignored emergencies altogether.  So a brief 
review is in order. 
 Many philosophers have deliberated, for example, about the ethics of war, which 
just war theory in effect endorses only as an emergency response.  And social contract 
theorists make a hypothetical emergency their point of departure.  For Hobbes, this took 
the form of people’s inability to go on living their short and brutish “natural” lives.  
Rousseau’s departure point is similar albeit quasi-anthropological and came with a 
warning that Hobbes’s approach justifies state monopoly of violence.53  Once 
internationalized in the Westphalian doctrine it became an excuse for the horrendous 
wars that have since dominated history.54  Academic opposition to this canonization of 
state-sponsored war has been serious and sustained, but for the most part ineffectual.  
This is understandable, though, in view of the inherent risks entailed in any questioning 
of a popular war.  Also understandable is philosophers’ lack of attention to emergency 
planning, which involves practical matters not a forte of the discipline.  Why, though, 
would philosophers not address emergency thinking as such?  Perhaps because 
emergency thinking, being subject to time and content constraints, seems alien to a 
philosophical agenda, which ordinarily seeks stable if not universal verities. 
 Political theorists, for example, do devise principles or rules that their preferred 
polity should embody, but they posit no time-frame within which these should be 
discovered and/or activated.  If one tried to impose time constraints on this process, this 
would arguably discourage philosophizing about it.  On the other hand the content 
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constraints inherent in emergency thinking do not preclude philosophical reflection.  
After all, some philosophers have put content constraints at the very heart of their 
methodology.  Kierkegaard, for one, turns the dialectical dead ends of human 
knowledge into occasions for reason-defying revelation.  And Rawls insists that his 
principle-producers could not delineate justice as fairness were they not behind a veil of 
ignorance.  Well below such rarified theoretical air we also find philosophers who 
recognize the epistemological importance of content-constrained practical thinking.55  
Only occasionally does one find a philosopher who dares address the emergency 
situation itself, as did Leibniz and William James. 
 A devastating factual emergency, namely the Lisbon earthquake, set Leibniz to 
thinking, not about how to prepare better for earthquakes but how to let God off the 
hook for allowing such disasters.  His optimistic theodicy is less well remembered than 
Voltaire’s satirical response.  A better example of philosophical concern about 
emergencies is the James-Lange theory of emotions.  According to this theory, fear of 
an oncoming bear does not initiate but is generated by physiological responses to 
perceptions of danger.56  It inspired few twentieth century epistemologists.  But by 
replacing the absolutism they inherited with a humbler search for humanly attainable 
standards of belief, they left the door ajar for emergency thinking.  As an indication of 
this shift, a 1967 encyclopedia article on epistemology focused on certitude; but a 1995 
encyclopedia article examined the “ethics of belief.”  In the latter, Peter Hare asks when 
one may act on an opinion without offending reason.  Views about this differ sharply, 
depending on whether one (1) wants to prohibit any action based on inadequate 
evidence or (2) would ban only actions based on a failure to satisfy some less rigorous 
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evidentiary standard.57  Such concessions to content constraints recognize that we do 
at times have to deal with bent circles, to borrow Plato’s example in the Meno.  But they 
do not tell us what to do if a bent circle threatens life and limb.  It is at this point that 
emergency response must quite literally come to the rescue.  This need not be taken, 
however, as a declaration of philosophical irrelevance to emergencies in general or to 
that arising out of 9/11.  For, there is an important conclusion to draw from my critique of 
post-9/11 rhetoric, and this conclusion invites the input of philosophers. 
 Put briefly, the rhetorical manipulation being practiced by Bush II is not just a 
case of “politics as usual.”  It is a prolegomena to the manufacture of additional 
emergencies to come, all of which can be subsumed under the code word ‘Iraq.’  To be 
sure, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks our local and national leaders had 
to make some decisions on the basis of inadequate information.  But the US 
government was partly responsible for the state of affairs in Afghanistan at that time, 
especially because its retaliatory cruise missile attack in 1998 brought the previously 
unfriendly Taliban and Al Qaeda together.58  So the US government lacks a clear 
justification for responding with a war however defined by experts in international law.  
Above all, there is no emergency-related justification for Bush II’s expansion of that war 
into an open-ended program of military engagements aimed at unrelated objectives.  It 
simply stretches the meaning of words too far to say that all these activities are initiated 
to fight a war on terrorism.  Besides, neo-conservative hawks had been looking for a 
way to justify their global agenda after the demise of the Soviet Union,59 so the events 
of September 11 were in that respect serendipitous. 
 What we are facing, then, are deliberate and consequential abuses of clarity.  
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And philosophers, being professionally sensitized to language usage, should not ignore 
such abuses of clarity.  Rather should we be challenging the biases that are inherent in 
antiterrorist terminology.  Granted, we are in no position to do so without benefit of 
empirical research; yet those of us who do not consider empirical research appropriate 
to our discipline can surely look to what others have found for guidance.  So doing, they 
could learn from the conclusion of a sociologist, for example, that the term terrorism “is 
inappropriate in every case in which one would do better to speak in terms of political or 
communal violence, or of all-out war.”60  Other scholars whose job description is not 
averse to looking at the world we all inhabit have also argued that such biased usages 
as ‘terrorism’ be replaced by the more neutral term ‘violence’.61  This shift in usage 
would not bring imperialism to heel, quite obviously.  As is the case with police brutality 
charges, though, any use of violence as a means to an end would be open to the 
criticism that it was or would be excessive, thereby necessitating a justification based, 
say, on self-defense.  This mode of justification can also be abused.  But such abuse of 
language can be put to the test of proportionality in a way that the old rules for a just 
war no longer can.  These observations only limn the surface of all that is at issue, but 
this in itself seems to make the subject eminently worthy of debate among philosophers 
and other academics. 
 Reality, of course, is never fully captured in rhetoric; but rhetoric can reveal what 
its users would like reality to be.62  The desired reality in the case at hand, it seems, is 
well described by the word ‘empire.’  The quest for empire, though, is not response to 
an emergency.  Nor is it even antiterrorism.  It is rather pursuit of a policy of world 
supremacy; and no previous seeker of that objective has come close to achieving it 
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without becoming the most skillful terrorist of them all.63  So antiterrorism has coopted 
emergency response and is itself being co-opted by a vision of empire espoused by 
self-styled conservative internationalists.  If we choose not to contest their dominance-
oriented vision, we may need to adapt our vocabulary to a version of Newspeak 
fashioned for us by doctrinaire “free enterprise” expansionists. 
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Abbreviations: CSM = Christian Science Monitor; NYT= New York Times; WSJ = Wall 
Street Journal. 
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